In general, a publisher may reprint an article in one issue in a later edition of his newspaper or magazine (”a subsequent collective work of the same series”). However, when publishers publish in new media, legal issues become more complex. In one case, the New York Times scanned articles from its print edition, placed them in a database, and made them individually available online. The Supreme Court ruled that the online version of the articles, since they were individually visible, infringed the freelance writers` copyrights because they were ”distinct from their original context” and did not reproduce the original selection and arrangement. See New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001). On the other hand, the court suggested that the preservation of the collective work by means of microfilm would be an admissible revision, since microfilm retains the original organization, presentation and context of the collective work. For example, a magazine publisher may distribute digital scans of its printed magazines because the resulting work uses the ”almost identical selection, coordination and arrangement of the underlying works as used in the original collective works.” See Faulkner v.
National Geographic Enters., 409 F.3d 26, 38 (2nd Cir. 2005). Some common examples of collective work include poetry anthologies, journals, journals, and scientific journals. In general, each issue of the newspaper, magazine or magazine is a collective work consisting of individual articles, some of which are written by freelancers. (For a discussion of the difference between work created by a freelancer – or independent contractor – and an employee, see the section on works owned by someone else.) The freelancer owns the copyright of his individual contribution and the publisher holds the copyright of the collective edition of the newspaper. The person compiling the collective work (the ”collective author”) owns the copyright in the selection and arrangement, but the owners of the copyright in the underlying works retain their rights. See 17 U.S.C. 201(c), 17 U.S.C. 103(b). Yes.
If a copyright owner wishes to commercially exploit the copyrighted work, he or she usually transfers one or more of those rights to the natural or legal person responsible for placing the work on the market, e.B a book or software publisher. It is also common for the copyright owner to limit the exclusive rights transferred. For example, the owner may limit the transfer to a certain period of time, allow the exercise of the right only in a certain part of the country or world, or require that the right be exercised only by certain media such as hardcover books, cassettes, magazines or computers. 3. Unless otherwise agreed, the co-owners share in the profits of the exploitation of the work. Elton is free to license the song to an advertiser without Bernie`s consent, provided the license is not exclusive, but he must share the costs or royalties with Bernie. Shared ownership of copyright is a sensitive issue in any transaction. This is an issue that is regularly confronted in digital media companies, where the rights to the underlying content often belong to more than one person and licenses are granted retroactively. Recent decisions of the Second and Ninth Circuit courts of appeals have raised enormous concerns about the erosion of the rights of copyright co-owners. In Davis v. Blige, the Second Circuit ruled that copyright co-owners cannot unilaterally issue retroactive licenses. And in sybersound v.
UAV Corp., the Ninth Circuit ruled that a copyright co-owner cannot grant an exclusive license without the consent of all other co-owners. The combined effect of these decisions has been described in copyright law as the ”death of divisibility”. These decisions threaten to create significant difficulties for anyone wishing to acquire rights to a copyright held by more than one person. The issue of retroactive licensing had been considered in a number of cases before district courts, but this was the first time that the issue had been considered by an appeal court. The case revolved around two songs written by Mary J. Blige, Bruce Miller and others, all of whom were defendants in the case. Plaintiff Sharice Davis claimed blige`s songs infringed her copyright on two songs she co-wrote with Bruce Chambliss, Blige`s father-in-law and Miller`s father. Miller, however, claimed that Chambliss, who was not biased in the case, wrote the contested compositions himself and verbally agreed to transfer all rights to the music to Miller. The crux of the matter, however, revolved around a written agreement between Miller and Chambliss, written two days before Chambliss` first testimony. The agreement provided that all rights to Chambliss` works would be transferred to Miller retroactively from the date of their creation. This would make Miller a co-owner of the two controversial compositions and confirm the licenses he granted Blige to use the works.
If the Court of Appeals had upheld the agreement, as the District Court did, Davis would have lost all of his claims for prior infringement against the other defendants. The Second Circuit overturned the District Court`s decision, ruling that a co-author cannot immunize a third party from past infringements by retroactively granting a license for the infringed work. .
